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ABSTRACT
At least ninety countries implement Freedom of Information laws
that state that government documents must be made freely avail-
able, or opened, to the public. However, many government doc-
uments contain sensitive information, such as personal or confi-
dential information. Therefore, all government documents that are
opened to the public must first be reviewed to identify, and protect,
any sensitive information. Historically, sensitivity review has been
a completely manual process. However, with the adoption of born-
digital documents, such as e-mail, human-only sensitivity review
is not practical and there is a need for new technologies to assist
human sensitivity reviewers. In this paper, we discuss how issues
of fairness, accountability, confidentiality, transparency and safety
(FACTS) impact technology-assisted sensitivity review. Moreover,
we outline some important areas of future FACTS research that will
need to be addressed within technology-assisted sensitivity review.
1 INTRODUCTION
At least ninety countries around the world implement Freedom
of Information (FOI) acts, i.e. laws that state that information that
is produced by the governments or public bodies must be made
available, or opened, to the public [21], for example in the UK [30]
and the USA [20]. FOI assumes that all of the information within
government documents will be made available, either through a
release on request model whereby documents are opened in re-
sponse to individual FOI requests [20, 30] or an open by default
model whereby historical documents are transferred to a public
archive [29]. However, government documents can contain sen-
sitive information, such as information that would likely damage
the national security or international relations of countries if the
information was made freely available. Therefore, FOI acts typically
provide exemptions that negate the obligation to open information
that is of a sensitive nature. Moreover, all government documents
that are opened to the public must first be manually sensitivity
reviewed to identify and protect any sensitive information.
Over the last twenty to thirty years, governments have increas-
ingly used born-digital documents, such as emails, word processing
documents, PDFs and on-line discussions, instead of paper docu-
ments. These digital documents now need to be made available to
the public and, therefore, must be sensitivity reviewed. It has been
widely recognised, e.g. in [2, 7, 26, 27], that due to the volume of
documents that are to be reviewed there is a need for technology-
assisted review (TAR) approaches: i.e. using information retrieval
(IR) and machine learning technologies to identify sensitive infor-
mation and assist with the sensitivity review of digital documents,
this is usually referred to as Technology-Assisted Sensitivity Review.
Recently, advances have been made in developing automatic ap-
proaches for classifying sensitive information and assisting digital
sensitivity review, e.g. [15, 17]. However, to adhere with FOI and
due to the potential consequences of releasing sensitive informa-
tion, assistive technologies will need to strictly adhere to principles
of fairness (e.g. to not discriminate against particular groups of
people), accountability (e.g. produce results in a principled man-
ner), confidentiality (e.g. not reveal sensitive or secret information),
transparency (e.g. by explaining their decisions) and safety (e.g.
mitigate against adversarial abuse) (FACTS) [5].
In this position paper, we present our current views on how
issues relating to FACTS have specific implications for IR and TAR
systems that are explicitly tasked with finding, or assisting a human
reviewer to find, sensitive information. Moreover, we discuss some
of the more pressing areas of future research that will enable IR
and TAR systems are to be able to maintain FACTS in technology-
assisted sensitivity review.
The examples that we discuss in this paper focus on the UK gov-
ernment domain. However, there is a need for technology-assisted
sensitivity review in many other countries (and for other organi-
sations, such as police departments). For example, the expectation
within the archival community is that Commonwealth countries are
likely to follow what the UK implements. Indeed, a recent study has
found that there is already a real demand for technology-assisted
sensitivity review in Malawi [28].
The remainder of this paper is as follows: We begin by provid-
ing a short overview of technology-assisted sensitivity review and
related tasks in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss the implications
of fairness (Section 3.1), accountability (Section 3.2), confidentiality
(Section 3.3), transparency (Section 3.4) and safety (Section 3.5)
for technology-assisted sensitivity review. Moreover, we provide
an overview of what we argue to be some of the most important
challenges that need to be addressed when developing responsible
IR and TAR systems for automatically identifying sensitive infor-
mation. Finally, we summarise our conclusions in Section 4.
2 TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED SENSITIVITY
REVIEW AND RELATED TASKS
Figure 1 illustrates the input, process and the output of the technology-
assisted sensitivity review task. The input to the process is a col-
lection of digital documents, D, that are to be opened to the public,
e.g. that are to be publicly archived. Technology-assisted sensitivity
review is an iterative process, whereby a sensitivity classifier is
deployed to classify documents, di ∈ D, in batches of k documents.
A human reviewer then reads the k documents and records a sen-
sitivity judgement, ji , for each document. A sensitivity judgement,
ji , needs to record if the document is sensitive or not sensitive. For
a document that is judged as sensitive, the sensitivity judgement
must also include: (1) the sensitivities that apply to the document;
(2) which parts (e.g. sentences or paragraphs) of the document they
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A	collec0on	of	born-digital	
documents	that	are	to	be	
transferred	to	a	public	
archive.	
A	sensi0vity	classifier	is	
deployed	to	classify	batches	
of	k	documents	as	sensi:ve	
or	not-sensi:ve.	
	A	human	reviewer	reads	
each	of	the	k	documents	in	
turn	to	iden0fy	and	record	
any	sensi0ve	informa0on,	
providing	feedback	to	the	
classifier	as	they	review.	
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Figure 1: Technology-assisted sensitivity review: input, process and output.
apply to; and (3) a textual description, or justification, about why
the information is sensitive and should, therefore, be closed. The
output of the digital sensitivity review process is the collection
of sensitivity reviewed documents and the corresponding set of
sensitivity judgements, J , where for each document, di , there is a
sensitivity judgement, ji . The information recorded in a sensitiv-
ity judgements, along with the newly judged documents, provide
feedback to the sensitivity classifier after each iteration.
As can be seen from Figure 1, one of themain tasks for a technology-
assisted sensitivity review system is to automatically classify docu-
ments by whether they do or do not contain sensitive information.
Historically, most of the work on automatically classifying sensitive
information in documents has focused on the anonymisation of
structured personal data, such as names, addresses, telephone or
bank account numbers. Early examples of automatic anonymisation
or redaction of documents used dictionaries (or medical knowledge
bases) to term-match known sensitive terms and regular expres-
sions to identify repeated patterns such as postal codes and dates of
birth [11, 18, 25]. Named entity recognition (NER) has also become
a popular approach for masking personal data, relating to persons,
organisations and locations [1, 6, 8–10, 32].
It is only relatively recently, however, that research has advanced
in the more general task of automatically classifying sensitive infor-
mation that is exempt from public release through FOI. For example,
in [17], we showed that text classification [23] is a viable approach
for developing automatic sensitivity classification. Our initial re-
search focused on learning sensitivity classification models from
examples of historical sensitivities (i.e. offline learning). More re-
cently, however, our work has focused on an assistive model to aid
the accuracy and speed of the sensitivity reviewer, whereby the
classifier learns from a reviewer as they review (i.e. active learning)
to make predictions about sensitivities that are specific to the col-
lection being reviewed [15]. Each of these tasks, i.e. learning from
historical sensitivities, learning from reviewers and predicting sen-
sitivity, have FACTS implications that will have to be addressed in
future research. We discuss some of these implications in Section 3.
Out-with the government context, the most closely related task
to sensitivity identification of which we are aware is the identi-
fication of privileged information in eDiscovery [19]. In general,
eDiscovery is concerned with the identification of documents that
are responsive (relevant) to a production request in a lawsuit. Typi-
cally, less-senior paralegals are tasked with reviewing documents
to identify responsive ones. Increasingly, active learning classifica-
tion systems [24] are used to refine the rankings of documents to
increase recall while reducing reviewer efforts [4]. However, before
any responsive documents can be provided to the other party, each
document must be reviewed to identify privileged information that
should not be handed over: e.g. information that is protected due to
solicitor-client privilege or potential self-incrimination. Typically,
such privilege decisions are nuanced and a senior lawyer involved
in the process will mak em [14]. Overall, privilege can be seen
as a form of sensitivity and we expect that identifying privileged
information will share many of the same FACTS implications as
digital sensitivity review.
3 THE FACTS OF TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED
SENSITIVITY REVIEW
In this section we discuss some of the issues relating to fairness (Sec-
tion 3.1), accountability (Section 3.2), confidentiality (Section 3.3),
transparency (Section 3.4) and safety (Section 3.5) that future re-
search on technology-assisted sensitivity review will need to ad-
dress.
3.1 Fairness
It is generally accepted that automatic approaches for identify-
ing sensitive information (e.g. sensitivity classification [17]), and
technology-assisted sensitivity review [15], will not completely
replace human sensitivity review for the foreseeable future [26].
However, as governments come to rely more on automatic tech-
nologies to help to decide what documents should or should not be
released to the public, there is a risk that biases are introduced to the
decision making process due to the classification learning process.
For example, a sensitivity classifier that inaccurately learns that
members of a particular ethnic or societal group are more likely to
be terrorists could potentially lead to a disproportionate number of
closure applications1 for documents relating to those groups. Not
only would the introduction of biases such as these have implica-
tions for the (groups of) people who are affected (e.g. an incorrectly
reinforced perception of an association with terrorism), but they
also have the potential to result in decision making practices that
are not legally sound. For example, in the UK, the Equality Act
2010 [31] legally protects the rights of people from discrimination
due to, for example, their age, race, disability, gender, religion or
belief, gender reassignment, sex or sexual orientation.
To mitigate against fairness issues such as these, it will be nec-
essary to ensure that, when learning to identify sensitivity from
1In the UK, if a document is judged as being sensitive, the government department
must submit an application to a governing body to seek for the information to be
redacted or the document to be retained. There are publicly available statistics on the
closure applications that are made.
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historical examples, the real-world distributions of categories of
groups (i.e. demographics) that are potentially likely to be discrimi-
nated against will have to be accurately reflected in the data that
is used to train and evaluate the sensitivity classifiers. Moreover,
efforts will have to be made to mitigate against the representations,
e.g. classification features, being constructed in a manner that in-
troduces bias. As a safety check, the sensitivity predictions that are
made in production environments will need to be monitored and
analysed to identify any skewed distributions in the predictions.
3.2 Accountability
Government departments, or other public authorities that are re-
sponsible for releasing information through FOI, are held legally
accountable for the decisions that they make when choosing to
release, or not to release, documents. Therefore, for governments to
be able to make use of assistive technologies for identifying sensi-
tive information, the technologies must be predicated on the same
frameworks and guidelines that the government works within. For
example, the sensitivity predictions made by a sensitivity classifier
must be guided by the details of the FOI laws. Moreover, sensitivity
classifiers should not produce unreasonable or unexpected results.
To be able to meet the accountability requirement, technolo-
gies for assisting digital sensitivity review must be developed in
a principled manner to ensure that the steps that led to a specific
sensitivity classification prediction being made can be identified.
To address this, our approach so far has been to focus our research
on developing linear classification models in which each of the
feature engineering approaches that we deploy allow for the de-
cision making process to be traced, from a document’s vectorised
representation, back through the system to know precisely why
the prediction was made.
In recent years, however, there have been many advances in
the state-of-the-art for text classification techniques, beyond lin-
ear classification models. It is expected that such approaches, e.g.
CNNs [34] or Hierarchical Attention Networks [33], may become
more effective for sensitivity classification as the volume of docu-
ments that need to be sensitivity reviewed increases in the coming
years. However, it has previously been shown that deep learning
approaches, such as neural networks, can encode sensitive infor-
mation into the learned model early in the learning process and
this information can potentially be reverse engineered [3]. This
is problematic since governments are likely to be legally obliged
to release publicly certain details of the sensitivity review process.
Therefore, for governments to adopt deep learning sensitivity clas-
sification approaches, there will need to be further research into
the potential risks of inadvertently releasing sensitive information
due to maintaining an expected level of public accountability.
Another consideration relating to the accountability of technology-
assisted sensitivity review arises from the fact that sensitivity
evolves over time. This could be due to a number of reasons. For
example, it may be due to: changing political circumstances (e.g.
the need for Brexit negotiations means that some previously made
comments could now be more sensitive than if the UK was not
leaving the EU); changes in the FOI laws that governments have
to adhere; or from an individual exercising their right to be forgot-
ten [13]. To address these concerns, there is a need for new research
into how sensitivity classification models that rely on historical
data can retain expected levels of accuracy while remaining aligned
with changing perceptions of sensitivity over time.
3.3 Confidentiality
The primary purpose of technology-assisted sensitivity review is
to assist human reviewers to review and release to the public as
many non-sensitive documents as possible in the least amount of
time. As part of this process, sensitivity classification is tasked with
identifying sensitive information. Therefore, the overall purpose of
technology-assisted sensitivity review is to not release sensitive (or
confidential) information when releasing documents to the public.
Concerns about accidentally releasing such sensitive information
are clear and we discuss them throughout the rest of this paper.
There are, however, potentially other confidentiality matters that
should be considered when developing technology-assisted sensi-
tivity review systems. For example, when deploying active leaning
approaches to learn the from reviewers, the reviewers actions must
be logged as they perform their review. There is a potential for such
logging activities to release information about the reviewers if the
log data is not handled appropriately. Moreover, there is a poten-
tial risk that learning from reviewers could encode unconscious
biases into a sensitivity classifier’s model. If these biases skew the
classifier’s predictions to unfairly bias a particular group of people,
it is possible that (due to the necessity for accountability of the
system) certain biases could potentially be traced back to individual
reviewers if an in-house audit was conducted. If this were to hap-
pen, a reviewer may find themselves in an unfavourable situation.
Therefore, technology-assisted sensitivity review systems will need
to provide some reassurances that the data the system collects from
the reviewers could not be used to their detriment.
3.4 Transparency
Transparency is one of the founding principles of FOI. Ultimately,
democratic governments must be seen to be transparent in their
decision making process and TAR systems for sensitivity review
are in effect decision-support systems. Moreover, in our previous
work [16], we showed that providing reviewers with automatic
sensitivity classification predictions can enable the reviewers to
make accurate reviewing decisions more quickly.
In practice, when assisting digital sensitivity review, this means
that reviewers and governments departments must be provided a
mechanism to reason about, and explain, why the classifier makes
each of its sensitivity predictions. As we previously stated in Sec-
tion 3.2, our research so far has focused on developing linear clas-
sification models. This approach, along with a SVM classifier for
text classification, has enabled us to use a simple heuristic, i.e. a
term feature’s perpendicular distance from the classification hy-
perplane [12], to provide reviewers with information about the
terms in a document that are most influential in a sensitivity clas-
sification prediction. However, if more complex models are going
to be deployed for sensitivity classification then a more principled
approach will be necessary. There have been some recent examples
of how the decisions of non-linear models can be explained, for
example in [22]. However, there will need to be further research
into how approaches for explaining sensitivity predictions actually
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benefit sensitivity reviewers, and what types of explanations are
most useful in practice.
3.5 Safety
Current research into developing algorithms for classifying sen-
sitive information, and assisting sensitivity review, has the intent
of enabling the release of more non-sensitive documents into the
public domain than would be possible through a purely manual
approach. However, the sensitivity review process is not infallible
and it will continue to be the case that some sensitive documents
will be released accidentally. Therefore, developing sensitivity clas-
sification technologies does raise some concerns about how the
technologies could be used for adversarial purposes.
Publicly archived digital government documents are more easily
discoverable than their paper equivalents due to the ubiquity of
modern indexing and search technologies (discovering archived
paper documents requires someone to physically visit an archive
and manually inspect a document collection.) There is a risk that
sensitivity classification technologies could be used for adversarial
purposes such as blackmail if the algorithms were to be acquired
by people who are intent on using them for personal gain. This
could clearly be damaging for whoever is being targeted and could
potentially lead to governments overturning FOI laws. This, in turn,
would have implications for the ability of the public to scrutinise
the actions of governments. Future research will, therefore, have to
evaluate the potential risk from such practices and try to ensure
that technologies that are intended to protect sensitive information
are not used for adversarial purposes.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The need for technologies to assist with the sensitivity review of
digital government documents has been recognised in many coun-
tries, including the UK and the USA. However, such technologies
will have to ensure that they abide by principles of fairness, account-
ability, confidentiality, transparency and safety (FACTS). In this
paper, we have discussed the implications for technology-assisted
sensitivity review with respect to these principles and outlined
some of the areas of future research that will need to be addressed.
For example, developing methods to ensure that sensitivity clas-
sification does not unfairly discriminate against certain groups of
people, and methods to minimise the risk of inadvertently releas-
ing sensitive information while maintaining an expected level of
public accountability. The demand for technology-assisted sensi-
tivity review will continue to increase in the coming years and the
principles of FACTS will be integral to the technology’s success.
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